Our own starting point is a relational philosophy. By this we mean an ontology in which entities do not exist first and enter into relations afterwards, but come into being through the relations that constitute them — a position articulated in different vocabularies by many Indigenous philosophies as well as Whitehead, Barad, Ingold and many others. A person, on this view, is not a bounded self that subsequently encounters a world. A person is an ongoing pattern of relating: to a body, to others, to materials, places, institutions, and to the more-than-human world. This has a direct methodological consequence. If the human is constituted relationally, it cannot be adequately investigated by a method that begins by separating the observer from what is observed. The confusion about how to human well that IPeP takes as its object is, in these terms, not primarily a deficit of information but of relation — and an inquiry into it must itself take the form of relating. Relational ontology is by now well described. A relational method — one that trains the capacity to perceive relations rather than objects — is not.